How does Brazil's electronic voting machine work inside?

Where Brazil's voting machine came from, what it is inside, who audits its software and how any voter can check their polling station's result with a phone.

Sunday, October 25, was runoff day in Brazil. Millions of Brazilians typed in a few numbers, pressed the green “Confirma” button and heard that little beep everyone in the country knows. But few people stop to think about what happens to the vote after that.

I’ve worked in technology for more than 25 years, and here I want to open that box with you. No politics, candidates or parties. Just technology: where Brazil’s voting machine (the urna eletrônica) came from, what it is inside, how it’s verified and how you can check your polling station’s result yourself.

If you’d rather watch, the full video (in Portuguese) is on the Escovando Bytes YouTube channel.

An idea from 1932 that waited 60 years

Voting with a machine is a much older idea than it seems. Brazil’s 1932 Electoral Code, the same law that created the Electoral Justice system, the secret ballot and women’s right to vote, already mentioned “voting machines”, as the Paraná Regional Electoral Court recounts. The technology to do it only arrived six decades later.

Until the 1990s, Brazilians voted on paper ballots counted by hand. Manual counting was slow and left room for fraud. In 1995, the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) set up a technical commission led by researchers from INPE, the National Institute for Space Research, and CTA, the Air Force’s technical center, to create a Brazilian voting machine, according to the TSE itself. In other words: space engineers designed the voting machine.

It debuted in 1996, in 57 cities, including every state capital. About 32 million voters cast an electronic vote for the first time. The keypad deliberately imitated a telephone’s, so that people who couldn’t read and people with visual impairments could vote without trouble.

And that first machine, the UE96, had a 386 processor and used a floppy disk. A floppy disk! Some people say it looked like a microwave oven, as a CNN Brasil report recalls. By 1998, electronic voting already covered more than half of the electorate, and in 2000 it reached 100%. So in 2026, the machine turns 30.

What the machine really is

The voting machine is a computer, but a dedicated one: it was built for a single task, recording and storing votes. It doesn’t run a browser, open WhatsApp or install apps.

It has two parts. At the poll worker’s terminal, the worker identifies the voter, including by fingerprint, and releases the vote. At the voter’s terminal, you type in the numbers.

The most important point is that the machine doesn’t connect to the internet. It has no Wi-Fi, no Bluetooth and no network cable, and works in isolation for the whole election day. A tech person would call it an “offline embedded system”: something much closer to the computer inside an industrial machine than to a laptop.

Each machine lasts about ten years, and since 1996, 14 different models have been built, according to the Paraná court.

Before the election: who gets to look at the software

The question everyone asks is whether the software running inside can be trusted. The Electoral Justice’s answer is to let that software be inspected.

A year before the election, the machine’s source code (the set of instructions that tells the program what to do) is opened for inspection by organizations like the Brazilian Bar Association, the Federal Police, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, political parties and universities.

Then comes the Public Security Test. It has existed since 2009 and has been mandatory since 2016: any Brazilian over 18 can sign up, present an attack plan and try to break the system’s security. The machines used in 2026 went through this test in December 2025.

To be honest: in some editions, participants found flaws. Federal Police experts and researchers such as professor Diego Aranha have demonstrated vulnerabilities, as Olhar Digital reports. But that is exactly what the test is for: find the problem, fix it and test again before the election. According to the TSE, none of the flaws found in these tests compromised ballot secrecy or the result.

Once everything is ready, the programs receive a digital signature in a public sealing ceremony. That’s where the hash comes in, a kind of fingerprint of the program. If someone changes a single character of the code, that fingerprint changes completely. That way anyone can check that the program on the machine is exactly the one that was sealed.

On election day: the machine proves it’s empty

Before the first voter casts a ballot, the machine prints a slip called the zerésima (“zero report”), showing that no votes are recorded in it. Poll workers and party observers sign that slip.

On the same day comes the Integrity Test: some machines are drawn at random and, instead of going to a polling station, stay in a public place. There, votes that were filled out beforehand on paper ballots are typed in, with everything filmed. At the end, the machine’s result is compared with the paper ballots, explains Diário do Comércio. If the machine diverted votes, the difference would show up there.

Afterward: how to check your polling station’s result

When voting closes at 5 p.m., the machine prints the Boletim de Urna (BU), the polling station report. It shows how many votes each candidate got at that station, plus blank and spoiled votes and how many people voted. The report is posted at the station itself, observers take a copy, and it carries a digitally signed QR code.

This is where your phone comes in:

  1. Install Boletim na Mão, the Electoral Justice’s official app.
  2. Point the camera at the QR code on a printed report.
  3. The app reads the data and checks the digital signature.
  4. Compare it with the same report published on the TSE website.

The election result is, in the end, the sum of all these public reports. And each one of them can be checked by anyone, as shown in the TSE’s technical presentation on the machine’s layers of security.

Why this is worth knowing

Thirty years after the floppy disk, the logic is the same: a computer that doesn’t talk to the internet, with software open to inspection, tested by outsiders, sealed and signed, and with each station’s result printed and published. You don’t have to take my word for it: all the links are in the text, most of them from the TSE itself.

Any questions about how the machine works? Leave them in the comments of the video. They might become the next piece.

Watch the video (in Portuguese)
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